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I. Introduction 
It is astonishing, when one thinks of it, that a series of children's books is so crammed with law.  
Not one of the seven Harry Potter novels fails to explore difficult issues law, interpretation and 
especially the relationship of the state to the individual.  From practically the first page of Harry 
Potter and the Sorcerer's Stone (SS) we ponder issues of child custody, fosterage and adoption;1 
before Harry even gets to Hogwarts we have heard about crime and punishment,2 legal control 
over the use of magic,3 monetary policy,4 and Wizarding government.5  Before the series is 
complete we have witnessed five different judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, three changes 
                                                 
1 See J. K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE SORCERER'S STONE 13-17 (1997) (hereinafter SS) 
2 See id., at 59. 
3 See id., at 59, 80. 
4 See id., at 63, 75. 
5 See id., at 64-65. 
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in government, and the enactment and repeal numerous statutes and regulations.  Rowling could 
easily have written her spiritual, moralistic adventure series without these trappings.  Why are 
they there?6 
Further, when one examines the legal universe contemplated in these novels, one finds that the 
laws are radically inconsistent and incoherent, in many places rising to the level of caricature or 
absurd contradiction.  One could ascribe these apparent "errors" to carelessness on the part of the 
author, as in the case of Rowling's errors in astronomy and chronology.  But the incoherence and 
inconsistency in law is too systematic and flagrant for this; it bears the marks of having been 
considered carefully, in places with a sort of perverse glee.7 
I suggest that this deliberate incoherence is a commentary on the reliability and value of rules 
and institutions generally and of political and legal institutions in particular.  Rowling, I shall 
argue, uses the law as a backdrop against which to show the absolute dependence of the world on 
individual virtue and morality.  Institutions, rules, procedures cannot help us; only the good, 
moral man or woman, exercising free, individual choice, can do that. 
 
II. The Law & Literature Lens 
In this paper I will be viewing the Harry Potter novels through one of the lenses of the so-called 
"Law and Literature" movement.  This movement, which is generally thought to have begun with 
the publication of James Boyd White's The Legal Imagination,8 is actually a collection of related, 
overlapping, but incongruent strands of thought.9  While I have, elsewhere, described these 
different threads in great detail,10 here I should like to focus on two I think are relevant.  These 
are what Phillip N. Meyer calls "homiletics" and "ethnography."11 
                                                 
6 There are already several published articles concerning the legal issues in the Harry Potter novels.  They include 
Michael Barton, Harry Potter and the Half-Crazed Bureaucracy, 104  MICH. L. REV. 1523 (2006); Paul R. Joseph & 
Lynn E. Wolf, The Law in Harry Potter: A System Not Even a Muggle Could Love, 34 U. TOL. L. REV. 193 (2003); 
William P. MacNeil, "Kidlit" As "Law-and-Lit":Harry Potter and the Scales of Justice, 14 LAW & LITERATURE 545 
(2002); Aaron Schwabach, Harry Potter and the Unforgivable Curses: Norm-Formation, Inconsistency, and the 
Rule of Law in the Wizarding World, 11 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 309 (2006); Symposium: The Power of 
Stories: Intersections of Law, Literature and Culture: Harry Potter and the Law, 12 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 427 
(2005) (hereinafter Tex. Wesleyan Symposium). 
7 One can only imagine the pleasure with which Rowling described the careful and painstaking process of appeal, 
recordkeeping and formal procedure for the destruction of an animal, juxtaposed in adjacent chapters to the 
unilateral, abrupt, process-free decision to rip a man's soul out of his body with the Dementor's Kiss. See J. K. 
ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE PRISONER OF AZKABAN 217-18, 222, 247, 291-93, 400-402 (1999) (U.S. Edition) 
(hereinafter (PoA). 
8 JAMES BOYD WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION: STUDIES IN THE  NATURE OF LEGAL THOUGHT AND EXPRESSION 
(1973). 
9 Kenneth L. Schneyer, Hooting: Public and Popular Discourse About Sex Discrimination, 31 MICH. J.L. REFORM 
551, 561 (1998), citing James Boyd White, Law and Literature: "No Manifesto", 39 MERCER L. REV. 739 (1988) and 
Robin L. West, The Literary Lawyer, 27 PAC. L..J. 1187, 1187-88 (1996).  
10 Schneyer, supra note 9, at 560-563 and accompanying notes. 
11 Phillip N. Meyer, Convicts, Criminals, Prisoners & Outlaws: A course in Popular Storytelling in the Law School 
Curriculum, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 129, 130 (1992). 
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"Homiletics" is the branch of legal-literary studies that looks for the lessons lawyers and judges 
can learn from literature.  The assertion is that literature, which looks to what events and words 
mean to individual hearts and souls, has much to teach law, which focuses so much on formal 
causes, effects and guidelines.  Lawyers and judges act as if human behavior and motivation 
worked in a certain way; literature shows us that human beings are more subtle, complicated and 
perverse than the law acknowledges; the law should take these things into account.12 
"Ethnography" is the branch that looks for representations of law in literature.  The assertion here 
is that lawyers and judges do not understand how laypersons think or feel about law, or what law 
means to those people.  The "majestic equality"13 of the law, in Anatole France's famous phrase, 
can mean objectivity and evenhandedness for some, while it means perpetuation of inequality 
and abuse for others.  What law means in the trenches, what it means to the litigants, what it 
means to bystanders and witnesses, is typically far removed from what it means to lawyers.  
Literature, by showing us how writers of fiction see legal institutions, can tell us what they mean 
to "real people."14 
To examine Rowling's work we need both of these tools.  Of course we are examining 
representations of law in literature, that is, the way law and legal institutions appear in Rowling's 
work.  But Rowling does not purport to show us genuine laws or legal institutions; she has 
created imaginary institutions and allowed them to interact; consequently we are also looking at 
the way human beings "really" interact, or are likely interact, in the context of rules and 
principles. 
                                                 
12 See, e.g., John Denvir, "Deep Dialogue" -- James Joyce's Contribution to American Constitutional Theory, 3 
CARDOZO STUD. L. & LITERATURE 1 (1991); Carolyn Heilbrun & Judith Resnik, Convergences: Law, Literature and 
Feminism, 99 YALE L.J. 1913, 1936 (1990); Dmitry N. Feovanov, Luna Law: The Libertarian Vision in Heinlein's 
The Moon is a Harsh Mistress, 63 TENN. L. REV. 71 (1995); Norman J. Finkel, Achilles Fuming, Odysseus Stewing, 
and Hamlet Brooding: On the Story of the Murder/Manslaughter Distinction, 74 NEB. L. REV. 742 (1995); Vanessa 
Laird, Dueling Narratives in An American Tragedy and the Criminal Law, 59 TENN. L. REV. 131 (1991); Amy R. 
Mashburn & Dabney D. Ware, The Burden of Truth: Reconciling Literary Reality with Professional Mythology, 26 
U. MEM. L. REV. 1257 (1996); Martha Minow, Stripped Down Like a Runner or Enriched by Experience:  Bias and 
Impartiality of Judges and Jurors, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1201, 1214-18 (1992); Martha Minow, Identities, 3 
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 97 (1991); Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change:  Law, Language and 
Family Violence, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1665, 1687-88 (1990); Amy D. Ronner, Amathia and Denial of "In the Home" in 
Bowers v. Hardwick and Shahar v. Bowers: Objective Correlatives and the Bacchae as Tools for Analyzing Privacy 
and Intimacy, 44 U. KAN. L. REV. 263 (1994); Elizabeth Tobin, Imagining the Mother's Text:  Toni Morrison's 
Beloved and Contemporary Law, 16 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 233 (1993). 
13 "La majestueuse égalité des lois, qui interdit au riche comme au pauvre de coucher sous les ponts, de mendier 
dans les rues et de voler du pain."  (“[T]he majestic equality of the laws forbid rich and poor alike to sleep upon the 
bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal their bread.”)  ANATOLE FRANCE, THE RED LILY 95 (Winifred Stephens 
trans., 1908). 
14 See, e.g., RICHARD WEISBERG, POETHICS:  AND OTHER STRATEGIES OF LAW AND LITERATURE 51-92 (1992); Alan 
D. Boyer, Formalism, Realism and Naturalism:  Cross-Currents in American Letters and Law, 23 CONN. L. REV. 
669 (1991); Michael H. Hoffheimer, Artistic Convention and Natural Law:  Didactic Treatment of Justice and 
Authority in the Works of Fielding, Hawthorne, and Fritz Lang, 63 TEMP. L. REV. 483 (1990); Nancy E. Johnson, 
Women, Agency, and the Law: Mediations of the Novel in the Late Eighteenth Century, 19 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 269 
(1996); Penelope Pether, Jangling the Keys to the Kingdom: Some Reflections on The Crucible, on an American 
Constitutional Paradox, and on Australian Judicial Review, 8 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LITERATURE 317 (1996); Paul 
Joseph & Sharon Carton, The Law of the Federation:  Images of Law, Lawyers and the Legal System in "Star Trek:  
The Next Generation", 24 U. TOL. L. REV. 43 (1992); Larry Wertheim, Law as Frolic: Law and Literature in A 
Frolic of His Own, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 421 (1995) (reviewing WILLIAM GADDIS, A FROLIC OF HIS OWN 
(1994)).  
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III. Laws and Law Making 
In Anglo-American law, there are typically three different types of lawmaking. 
• Common law rules derive from pre-Norman tradition and are expanded, contracted and 
otherwise modified through court decisions and precedent.  A surprising proportion of legal 
issues in the common law countries are still matters of Common Law. 
• Statutes (also called "codes" or "acts") are enacted by legislatures, which are typically elected 
by popular vote and subject to recall.  Statutes have the advantage of precision and 
comprehensiveness that common law rules lack. 
• Administrative regulations are promulgated by executive agencies created to deal with 
specialized areas of law.  For example, in the U.S. the Internal Revenue Service has 
numerous regulations governing the reporting of income. 
Additionally, in the U.S. (and separately in its individual states) there is a single written 
Constitution that overrides all other forms of lawmaking.  Most of the federal constitution dates 
from 1787, but amendments can be made through a laborious and politically difficult process 
which has succeeded only seventeen times since the original document was created. 
In the Anglo-American system all forms of law are subject to "common-law reasoning," which 
means argument from precedent.  The meaning of a statute, regulation or constitutional provision 
can be inferred from the way it was previously interpreted in an earlier case. 
In the current context, one should probably mention executive orders as well.  These are 
decisions of the chief executive, and are generally held to be subservient to statutes. 
There are numerous references in the Harry Potter stories to various types of law.  They all seem 
to be statutes, administrative regulations, or possibly executive orders, although there are few 
indications that there is any distinction between these types.  Some are unnamed, while others 
carry specific designations such as codes, statutes or decrees.  Some named laws include the 
Muggle Protection Act,15 the Decree for the Reasonable Restriction of Underage Sorcery of 
1875,16 the International Confederation of Warlocks' Statute of Secrecy17 (of 1689),18 the 
Guidelines for the Treatment of Non-Wizard Part-Humans,19 the Code of Wand Use,20 the Ban 
on Experimental Breeding,21 the Decree for Justifiable Confiscation,22 the International Ban on 
                                                 
15 J. K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE CHAMBER OF SECRETS 51 (1999) (U.S. Edition) (hereinafter CoS). 
16 Id. at 21. 
17 Id. 
18 J. K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE DEATHLY HALLOWS 318 (2007) (U.S. Edition) (hereinafter DH).  This is, 
of course, the date of the Glorious Revolution in England. 
19 J. K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE GOBLET OF FIRE 147 (2000) (U.S. Edition) (hereinafter GoF). 
20 Id. at 132. 
21 J. K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE ORDER OF THE PHOENIX 129 (2003) (U.S. Edition) (hereinafter OotP). 
22 DH, supra note 18, at 123. 
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Dueling,23 the Werewolf Code of Conduct of 1637,24 the Wizengamot Charter of Rights,25 and 
various Educational Decrees enacted by the Minister of Magic, notably Educational Decrees 22 
and 23.26 
Nowhere, however, are we given any notion how these laws are enacted.  We know that they are 
created by the Ministry of Magic, the only form of government wizarding Britain has.  We know 
that various Ministry employees work on these laws and presumably champion their enactment, 
as in the case of Arthur Weasley's Muggle Protection Act,27 Pius Thickness's specific bans on 
transportation to Privet Drive,28 and Dolores Umbridge's presumed hand in Educational Decrees 
22 and 23.  We know that, at least in the case of Educational Decree 23, the enactment had to be 
"formalized" by the Ministry, although we do not know how this was accomplished.29  We know, 
too, that Lucius Malfoy is able to use his influence with the Minister to "delay laws he doesn't 
want passed".30 
It does seem that, at least in some contexts, common law reasoning applies to wizarding law.  
When working to save Buckbeak the hippogriff from being killed, Hermione looks for previous 
cases that can act as precedents in Buckbeak's favor.31  This is the way a lawyer would argue 
interpretation of the law in the Anglo-American system: find a precedent and argue by analogy.  
But notably this is the only time when an argument from prior decisions is made.  Throughout 
the rest of the series, statutes and regulations are followed to the letter, and only exceptions in the 
text of the law itself are relevant. 
One thing is clear, however.  The Minister of Magic has the authority to create, approve and 
revoke statutes and regulations.  There is no one who supersedes him and no procedure to 
override him. 
Curiously, in this lengthy narrative with hundreds of legal references, there is only one explicit 
reference to lawyers or other professional advocates.  When Hermione exposes Rufus 
Scrimgeour's dishonest manipulation of the Decree for Justifiable Confiscation, he asks her 
whether she's considering a career in Magical Law.32  She retorts, "No, I'm not . . . I'm hoping to 
do some good in the world."33  When Harry is on trial before the Wizengamot, he is effectively 
(and skillfully) represented by Albus Dumbledore, but technically Dumbledore appears only as a 
witness34.  In the three judicial proceedings observed through the Pensieve, there are no 
                                                 
23 GoF, supra note 19, at 425. 
24 SS, supra note 1, at 263. 
25 OotP, supra note 21, at 142. 
26 Id. at 307. 
27 CoS, supra note 15, at 51. 
28 DH, supra note 18, at 46. 
29 OotP, supra note 21, at 307. 
30 Id, at 155. 
31 PoA, supra note 7, at 221-22, 274, 292. 
32 DH, supra note 18, at 123.  
33 Id., at 124.  Yet it is only Hermione who displays anything like the interpretive logical thought required by 
common law reasoning.  It is she who examines old precedents to find grounds for preventing the extermination of 
Buckbeak.  It is she who argues that the Decree for Justifiable Confiscation should be limited to its legislative intent.  
DH, supra note 32 at 123. 
34 OotP, supra note 21, at 139. 
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advocates for the defense, and it is unclear whether Barty Crouch Sr., who is essentially the 
prosecutor, is acting as an "advocate" or (as would be the case in some Civil Law countries) in 
his capacity as a judge in the court.35 
We have, then, a world with "laws" but no lawyers, courtrooms but no advocates, regulation but 
no public process for commenting or changing them.  The word "law," in this case, begs the 
question.  If laws say whatever a particular government employee wants them to say, are 
enforced only when the executive feels like enforcing them, and do not provide for experts or 
advocates to advise ordinary people who run afoul of them, in what way are they "laws" at all?  
As William P. MacNeil puts it, this society displays not the Rule of Law, but the "worst features 
of the Rule of Man and its capricious, arbitrary and erratic "'palm tree justice.'"36 
 
IV. Contracts and Legal Obligation 
The phrase that originally instigated this paper was "binding magical contract."37  Under the 
common law of both England and the United States, contracts are formed and enforced by a 
specific set of rules, familiar to every first-year law student.   A contract turns an ordinary 
promise into an obligation the law will enforce by sanctions such as an award of damages.  But 
for a promise to achieve contract status, several specific things must happen. 
One of these is consent, or agreement.  Parties cannot be held liable for a contract unless there is 
persuasive evidence that they voluntarily, genuinely entered into a binding agreement.  Since the 
court cannot read the parties' minds, evidence that would convince an ordinary, reasonable 
person that an agreement was genuinely intended is normally sufficient. Typically we look for 
evidence of an offer (one person's attempt to form a contract) and an acceptance (the other 
party's timely, voluntary agreement to the offeror's terms).  The point, however, is that no one is 
to be bound to a contract unless he or she gave every reasonable sign of agreeing to it. 
But in Harry Potter and the Goblet of Fire (GoF), Harry is held to a "binding magical contract" 
to which he never consented.  He never put his name in the Goblet of Fire and never agreed to 
compete in the hazardous Triwizard Tournament, but is bound to do so because his name 
appeared there.  It is significant, in this regard, that Dumbledore believes Harry's protestations, 
and the reader knows them to be true, even if Karkaroff and others scoff.38  We know he did not 
agree.  Nonetheless he is bound, endangering his life, a result that runs contrary not only to 
Anglo-American legal traditions, but to fundamental fairness.39 
Similarly, in Harry Potter and the Chamber of Secrets (CoS), we learn that manumission of a 
house-elf is achieved when the elf's master presents him or her with clothes.40  Manumission 
upon presentation of clothing occurs even when the elf does not wish to be freed, as in the case 
                                                 
35 GoF, supra note 19, at 585-96. 
36 MacNeil, supra note 6, at 550. 
37 GoF, supra note 19, at 256, 278.  
38 Id., at 276-77. 
39 See id.at 278-80. 
40 CoS, supra note 15, at 177. 
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of Winky.41 Yet when Harry tricks Lucius Malfoy into throwing a sock at Dobby, Dobby is 
freed, even though Lucius had no intent to free Dobby and no real awareness of what he was 
doing.42  Even if we did not know Lucius's intent, the objective facts do not lend themselves to 
the interpretation that he intended to set Dobby free; the act was obviously an inadvertent error.  
Again, this is incoherent. 
The issue of consent in the freeing of house-elves becomes even more complicated when one 
considers Hermione's attempts to free the house-elves at Hogwarts, against both their own wills 
and (presumably) the will of the school administrators, by leaving garments as booby-traps 
throughout Gryffindor Tower.43  As Timothy S. Hall puts it: 
…although Hermione clearly intends to grant the house-elves their freedom, how does she act as 
an agent of Hogwarts in this manner?  She clearly does not have express authority to act for 
Hogwarts, which depends greatly on house-elves for domestic chores and it is difficult to see how 
she could have implied authority to release the elves, as no reasonable person would think that a 
student would be empowered to make personnel decisions for a school.  Perhaps the author means 
to imply that the mere objective act of giving clothes creates the magical effect of granting 
freedom, without regard to the intent of the donor or her authority to make the gift.  But if this is 
so, why could Harry not free Dobby from the Malfoy's service by simply giving him a sock 
himself...?44 
Yet the house-elves studiously avoid the knitted hats Hermione leaves out, even to the point 
where they neglect cleaning Gryffindor Tower altogether.45  This implies that the elves (who 
militantly object to manumission) fear that they actually will be freed if they touch the clothing.  
But do house-elves avoid touching all clothing in wizard homes?  Do owners of manors with 
house-elven servants do all their own laundry to prevent releasing the elves?   
Under common law, minors are unable to form binding contracts.  Or, to be precise, if a minor 
chooses to disaffirm a previously made contract, the contract is then considered void, and all 
obligations under it are excused.  This is a rule designed to protect minors from their own 
incapacities -- the same purpose for which the Age Line was put in place around the Goblet of 
Fire.46  Yet despite the Age Line, despite Harry's contractual incapacity, and despite the fact that 
a fourteen-year-old is likely to be killed in such a hazardous activity, and despite the probability 
that someone put his name into the Goblet for precisely that purpose, Harry remains bound to 
compete.  Thus the contractual rules conflict even with the rules of the Tournament to which they 
apply. 
In this context we should mention the Unbreakable Vow.  The process by which Snape binds 
himself to his specific promises to Narcissa in Harry Potter and the Half-Blood Prince (HBP) 
looks more like common-law contract formation than any other agreement we have seen.  It is 
                                                 
41 GoF, supra note 19, at 138. 
42 CoS, supra note 40, at 338. 
43 OotP, supra note 21, at 255.  
44 Timothy S. Hall, Magic and Contract: The Role of Intent, in Tex. Wesleyan Symposium, supra note 6, at 466-67. 
45 OotP, supra note 21, at 385.  It could be, of course, that the house-elves, perceiving Hermione's intent in leaving 
the clothing, have ceased cleaning the Tower out of mere anger.  As Dobby says, "they finds them insulting, sir." Id. 
But this, too, is incoherent; house-elves love their work above all other things. 
46 GoF, supra note 37, at 188, 256. 
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entered into formally, with a witness (the Bonder) and a series of questions and answers that give 
objective evidence of consent.47  On the other hand, under common law a contractual promise 
must usually be supported by consideration -- that is, a bargained-for exchange having legal 
value -- in order to be binding.  Narcissa gives Snape nothing in exchange for his promise, so 
that under Anglo-American contract law it probably would not be binding.  This particular 
nonconformity is minor, however; in some contemporary contracts the binding consideration is 
more a matter of empty formality than anything else. 
But of course the Unbreakable Vow is self-enforcing; a promisor in breach of the Vow dies.48  It 
may be that the "binding magical contract" imposed by the Goblet of Fire has a similar 
enforcement mechanism.  Dobby's manumission, similarly, appears to be instantaneous, 
requiring no formal confirmation; it is the magic that has changed, not the law. 
Thus, there are a number of "contracts," "vows" or other binding obligations that exist in the 
magical world -- but they are all created and enforced by magic, not by rules of formation or 
procedure.  The normal rules of contract formation, which are designed to protect the 
expectations of the parties and to prevent fundamentally unjust things from happening, are absent 
from these obligations.  Instead, a person who knows the right kind of magic can create such an 
obligation, even for a promisor manifestly incapable of either understanding or keeping such a 
promise, such as the five-year-old Ron Weasley.49  It is as if a person of great economic power 
essentially forced someone with no such power into a binding agreement; arguably such is the 
case with a number of boilerplate agreements in commercial settings, such as software End User 
License Agreements and credit card terms; but all of these, at least nominally, are still subject to 
the rules of contract law (they would not, for example be enforced against minors).  Power 
overcomes procedures and rules. 
The rules of obligation by consent in the wizarding world, such as they are, are neither consistent 
nor organic.  Trickery and subterfuge can bind persons to obligations they never sought, and 
such enforcement mechanisms as exist will enforce these obligations regardless of fairness or 
public policy. 
 
V. Crime and Punishment 
In Anglo-American law, crimes were traditionally defined by common law, which indicated both 
a forbidden act (the actus reus) and criminal intent (the mens rea). In the last few centuries, an 
increasing number of crimes are defined by statute.  This is a lengthy process, involving 
consideration before a legislative body that takes months, sometimes years, to make a decision; 
these legislative bodies are all subject to election, however, so that popular will can change 
statutes by changing the legislature that enacts them.  Further, many states in the U.S. allow new 
laws to be made by plebiscite, so that a criminal law could theoretically be enacted by popular 
vote.  All of these criminal acts, however, are perceived to create some sort of danger to public 
                                                 
47 J. K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE HALF-BLOOD PRINCE 36-37 (2005) (U.S. Edition) (hereinafter HBP). 
48 Id. at 325-26. 
49 See id. 
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health, safety, property or morals.  There are relatively few strictly regulatory crimes, and the 
sanctions for these are comparatively slight. 
Numerous acts in the wizarding world are defined as crimes.  Apart from such obvious matters 
as murder,50 physical attacks (at least attacks on Muggles)51 and theft,52 a wide variety acts 
unknown to us Muggles are crimes.  The possession of Dark artifacts,53 changing events through 
time-travel,54 dragon breeding,55 any sort of experimental breeding of magical animals,56 "any 
magical activity that risks notice by [Muggles],"57 use of magic outside of school by wizards 
under the age of seventeen,58 and of course the Unforgivable Curses59 are all criminal acts, as 
well as a host of others.  The logic behind many of these offenses is obvious, but also appears 
that the Ministry of Magic is able to define new criminal acts at will, entirely for reasons of 
convenience or politics. In DH, for example, Pius Thicknesse, then the  Head of the Department 
of Magical Law Enforcement, makes it an imprisonable offense "to connect [the Dursleys' 
residence] to the Floo Network, place a Portkey here, or Apparate in or out."60  During the first 
war against Voldemort, passing information to his supporters was a criminal offense.61  After the 
coup in which Voldemort takes control of the Ministry numerous other acts are defined as 
crimes, but by that time all pretense of procedure has vanished. 
Criminal punishments in the U.S. can range from execution, in some states, to prison sentences 
of varying length in different varieties of penal institutions (higher and lower security, some 
involving labor, others not), probation, fines, restitution, assignment to transitional institutions, 
treatment programs, active monitoring, to some creative judicial sanctions tailored by the 
individual judge.  There is always, however, some attempt at proportionality.  In general, the 
severity of the punishment is supposed to reflect the severity of the crime, coupled with 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances.  In many states and until recently in the federal 
system, there are or were a series of guidelines designed to ameliorate differences in punishment 
between different judges. 
The range of punishments available for criminal behavior in the wizarding world, however, is 
limited.  While in the setting of school discipline, Hogwarts teachers deduct House points and 
assign a creative variety of unpleasant detentions, the Ministry's legal sanctions appear to include 
only three things: imprisonment in Azkaban for varying lengths, confiscation and destruction of 
the convict's wand, and the Dementor's Kiss.  Only in one instance to we see the alternative 
sanction of a fine, imposed on Arthur Weasley for bewitching a Muggle car,62 and it is not clear 
whether he would have received a different sanction had he not been a Ministry employee; that 
                                                 
50 See, e.g., PoA, supra note 7, at 37-38. 
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is, this may be an administrative penalty exacted within the Ministry rather than a criminal 
sentence. 
Apart from the fines, the severity of these punishments is alarming.  Azkaban is no ordinary 
prison, but a place where the dementors' corrosive influence is a living hell for all inmates, who 
relive and relive the worst moments of their lives, typically losing their sanity or starving 
themselves to death while incarcerated.63  All but the shortest sentences there amount to a 
sentence of death or permanent incapacitation.64  The Dementor's Kiss destroys the soul of the 
victim, amounting to not merely death, but (in spiritual terms) timeless nonexistence.65  The 
confiscation and destruction of a wand renders the victim unable to perform magic, which, in a 
community that revolves around the practice of magic, makes him or her a permanent exile. 
There appear to be few, if any, minor sanctions in the wizarding world.  Punishments are severe -
- although there does appear to be some rough attempt at proportionality.  For example, Morfin 
Gaunt receives a longer sentence in Azkaban than his father Marvolo, because of his prior 
"record of Muggle attacks."66  
It could be argued that the extremity of these punishments -- especially the dementor-ridden 
Azkaban and wand-snapping -- are necessary because of the magical abilities of the convicts.  
What, realistically, could one do to a wizard that he could not undo?  Without the confiscation of 
the wand, the convict could escape most ordinary prisons, and might be able to do so even 
without a wand if his powers were strong enough.  Although somehow Nick was successfully 
decapitated (albeit after 45 strokes of a blunt axe),67 mundane execution attempts against other 
witches and wizards were so ineffectual that they became a hobby and pastime for some, such as 
Wendelin the Weird.68  Nevertheless, here common humanity militates against employing so 
harsh a punishment. 
We hear a great deal about deliberate killing, both official and unofficial, in the Harry Potter 
novels.  Consider, though, the following strange contrasts: 
1. Use of the Killing Curse on another human being is one of the Unforgivable acts that 
results in a life sentence in Azkaban.69 
2. Killing a dangerous animal like a hippogriff requires a hearing before the Committee for 
the Disposal of Dangerous Creatures,70 which can be appealed71 and which is apparently 
                                                 
63 GoF, supra note 19, at 529. 
64 Morfin Gaunt, who spent three years in Azkaban, returned with his sanity apparently intact -- at least he was able 
to carry on a conversation with his nephew.  HBP, supra note 47, at 211-12, 363-65.  One could argue that Morfin 
was not fully sane to begin with, and he was badly dissipated when young Riddle met him. 
65 PoA, supra note 7, at 247. 
66 HBP, supra note 47, at 211-12. 
67 CoS, supra note 15, at 125. 
68 PoA, supra note 7, at 2. 
69 GoF, supra note 19, at 217. 
70 PoA, supra note 7, at 218.  
71 Id.at 291-92. 
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subject to arguments from precedent;72 once so ordered, the destruction of the animal 
requires two witnesses and a signed document.73 
3. Administration of the Dementor's Kiss, an act which consumes the soul of the victim, a 
fate worse than death that apparently precludes the afterlife that the Killing Curse may 
allow, is performed entirely at the whim of the Minister of Magic,74 or even his 
Undersecretary.75 
4. Killing of a house-elf, a sentient being, is performed at the whim of the wizard family the 
elf serves.76 
Even if one were to ascribe an astonishing level of sloppiness to Rowling (a sloppiness her work 
does not otherwise display), this kind of dissonance must be deliberate.  Destruction of an animal 
requires two levels of appeal and a document, but the destruction of a human soul requires no 
procedure whatsoever?  This is obviously not meant to imply that a hippogriff is deemed by the 
wizarding community to be more important than a human soul.  Instead, I think we are supposed 
to be appalled at the caprice of the law, where trivial things involved red tape and procedural 
niceties, but catastrophic things are done on a whim. 
This procedural reversal is also evident in in CoS, where we learn, within the space of four 
pages, of both Hagrid's temporary imprisonment in Azkaban and Dumbledore's removal as 
Headmaster.77  The suspension of Dumbledore requires the signatures of the members of the 
Governors on a written document; while Fudge orders the imprisonment of Hagrid with no 
procedural safeguards of any kind.  The contrast is immediate, deliberate, extreme and absurd.  
As Aaron Schwabach puts it, "Apparently wizarding law provides more protection for 
Dumbledore's job than for Hagrid's freedom."78 
Criminal law is the most basic underpinning of a civilization.  It proscribes and prevents conduct 
that endangers the welfare and safety of others, and allows society to exist and continue.  If it is 
not predictable, consistent, fair and in accord with the values of the polity, the state cannot 
endure.  But in the area of criminal law and punishment as we see them in the wizarding world, 
there reversal of priorities and a disregard of consequences.  Trivial things are punished severely 
and the criminal meaning of killing varies wildly.  The center cannot hold. 
 
VI. Due Process of Law 
Fundamental to notions of Anglo-American legal fairness is the concept of due process of law.  
In the U.K. this tradition traces its way back at least to Magna Carta; in the U.S., it is enshrined 
                                                 
72 See id. at 221-22. 
73 Id.at 400-401. 
74 PoA, supra note 7, at 247; GoF, supra note 19, at 702-03.  
75 OotP, supra note 21, at 747. 
76 Similar observations have been made by Aaron Schwabach.  Schwaback, supra note 6, at 329-30. 
77 CoS, supra note 15, at 260-264. 
78 Schwabach, supra note 6, at 315. 
Schneyer, No Place to Stand, 1.0  Page 12 of 22 
in the Fifth Amendment of the federal Constitution.  We believe, most of us, that no other legal 
protections matter unless this one is enforced. 
Briefly the notion of due process is this:  the government can't take anything away from me 
unless I have a chance to defend myself.  By "the government" we include any judge or jury, any 
government department, every government agency of any kind.  By "take anything away from 
me" we include my life, my freedom and my property.  By "a chance to defend myself," we 
mean that I have enough notification of the government's intent that I have a chance to make a 
defense, and that I have the opportunity to challenge the evidence against me and prove that it is 
wrong or inapplicable.  Thus, for example, if you want to sue me for breach of contract, you 
must notify me of the lawsuit by giving me papers that explain it, and you must allow me the 
chance to challenge your evidence and present my own in court, before an impartial decision-
maker who will decide based on the strength of the evidence.  Typically this also includes the 
right to be represented by counsel, so that I can make the best defense possible.  Were a court to 
order a judgment against me without these protections, the order would be invalid and 
unenforceable. 
 Without these protections, we believe, government officials and litigants will be able to harm 
others at will, with impunity. 
But in wizarding Britain, things are different.  Sirius Black is sentenced to life in Azkaban 
without a trial.79  Neither Barty Crouch, Jr., Ludo Bagman nor Igor Karkaroff has representation 
or any apparent opportunity to present witnesses.80  Hagrid is locked up in Azkaban on mere 
suspicion, with no chance to defend himself81.  Hapless, silly Stan Shunpike is imprisoned with 
essentially no evidence against him.82  Harry, an inexperienced minor, although he does receive 
several days' notice of his hearing, is subjected to a full criminal trial at an abruptly changed time 
and place, and is successful (indeed, receives a hearing instead of summary punishment) only 
because Dumbledore, a powerful and respected man, intervenes on his behalf.83 (True, the 
Wizengamot Charter of Rights says that "the accused as a the right to present witnesses for his or 
her case",84 but nobody tells Harry this, and only Dumbledore's intervention prevents Fudge from 
simply railroading the boy.)  Once Dolores Umbridge takes charge of Hogwarts, students are 
subjected to torture, violence and the threat of the illegal Cruciatus Curse with apparently no 
recourse whatever.85  Indeed, throughout the entire series the "defendant" provided with the 
greatest due process is Buckbeak the hippogriff! 
When Voldemort takes over the Ministry of Magic in Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows 
(DH), all semblance of due process vanishes.  People are rounded up without warning, subjected 
to summary process that is essentially an inquisitorial interview in which the language of the 
questions makes exculpatory evidence impossible to hear, and deprived of their rights 
(specifically, Muggleborn wizards and witches are deprived of their wands and summarily 
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convicted of "stealing" magic from "real" wizards).86  That Voldemort himself would take these 
steps surprises no one; what is surprising is that the Ministry and its legal apparatus convert so 
easily to this set of procedures.  Indeed, with very few exceptions, the persons who carry out 
these Nazi-like interrogations are recognizable former employees of the Ministry, such as 
Dolores Umbridge and Mafalda Hopkirk.87 
As Paul Joseph and Lynn Wolf put it: 
Rowling has created a legal system without lawyers and the result is a Kafkaesque nightmare in 
which the individual is often helpless.  Throughout the Harry Potter books, we noticed that the 
wizards caught up in the system have no idea how to answer charges against them, are often 
unclear about how the rules that govern decisions made about them or the procedures that are to 
be used, and do not know how to find precedents to support their positions or how and to whom 
to make their arguments.88 
Here, again, we see a rule of "law" that is nothing of the kind.  If decisions are determined by 
law, rather than by power, then individuals within the system must have realistic opportunities to 
defend themselves and to put forth the best arguments in their favor.  Without this, law favors 
only those who are already in positions of power and influence.  In Rowling's world, law does, in 
fact, serve power, but the appearance of law exists as a prop on which the powerful can rest 
claims of legitimacy.  By its absence, she shows us what is necessary for a system of justice to 
thrive.  
 
VII. Property, Wills and Inheritance 
The right to own and control private property, to buy it and sell it, and to leave it to others upon 
one's death, is one of the most ancient rights in the Western world.  It forms the backbone of 
much of our legal system.  Common law gave owners nearly absolute rights to decide how their 
property would be used or conveyed.  One can sell all of the rights in one's property, or 
subdivide those rights many times so that each buyer owns only one aspect of the property.  For 
example, in the case of land I own, I can sell one person the right to live there for a certain time 
period, another person the right to construct buildings there for an overlapping time period, and a 
third person the right to mine for gold there for the same time period, while a fourth person 
obtains these rights after those time periods have expired.  In the case of my death, I can devise a 
will that conveys these rights in the same way that selling them would; if I leave no will, then the 
law decrees that the property will go to my "heirs at law" -- typically my spouse, followed by my 
children, followed by my parents, etc. 
There are some restrictions on an owner's right to use and convey.  For example, normally a 
married person cannot bequeath his or her property so as to give the surviving spouse nothing at 
all.  Under a rule of common law that is nowadays very seldom honored, it was possible to 
                                                 
86 DH, supra note 18, at 208-10, 241-67 
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convey land in "fee tail," ensuring that it would go to the biological descendants (sometimes only 
the male descendants) of the owner, regardless of the owner's wishes.89  Rights of one's 
neighbors may restrict one's use of property, and public concerns such as environmental 
protection may severely limit them.  In the case of a compelling public use, the sovereign may 
take private property through the process of eminent domain, so long as the owner is 
compensated for the lost property. 
Given the sharp differences between wizarding law and ordinary common and statutory Anglo-
American law in so many other areas, what is most striking about the wizarding law of property 
is its apparent similarity to our own Muggle law.  Harry inherits all of his parents' property and 
money,90 is the sole devisee of Sirius's will,91 and receives specific bequests in Dumbledore's 
will.92  Further, the bequest of the Sword of Gryffindor fails because Dumbledore was not the 
owner of the property and consequently cannot convey it.93 
Interestingly, wizarding law has something very much like the "fee tail" although, as in the case 
of Muggle entailment, it is possible, in modern times, to override it.  Discussing Sirius's bequest 
of his house to Harry, Dumbledore says: 
"Black family tradition decreed that the house was handed down the direct line, to the next male 
with the name of 'Black.'  Sirius was the very last of the line as his younger brother, Regulus, 
predeceased him and both were childless.  While his will makes it perfectly plain that he wants 
you to have the house, it is nevertheless possible that some spell or enchantment has been set 
upon the place to ensure that it cannot be owned by someone other than a pureblood." 
…"I bet there has," [Harry] said. 
"Quite," said Dumbledore.  "And if such an enchantment exists, then the ownership of the 
house is most likely to pass to the eldest of Sirius's living relatives, which would mean his cousin, 
Bellatrix Lestrange."94 
Thus, although it is not a legal rule per se, it is possible for wizards to "entail" their property in 
much the same way that English landowners of the 18th century could do.  It turns out, however, 
that Sirius's will supersedes this tradition or enchantment, and that Harry is the true owner of the 
house.95  It is also noteworthy that Dumbledore uses the sort of terminology one sees in the 
Muggle law of trusts and estates, such as the word "predeceased." 
The most significant difference concerning property inheritance is that, under wizarding law, one 
inherits house-elves along with the house.  They appear to be magically linked, so that the 
rightful owner of the house acquires the instant ability to command the house-elf.  This is how 
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Dumbledore determines that Harry has actually become the owner of Twelve Grimmauld place; 
his ability to command Kreacher is the only test required.96 
In the barbaric past of American law before the enactment of the Thirteenth Amendment, it was 
possible to inherit a slave.  But I am not aware of any slaves who were considered fixtures to real 
estate; they were treated, rather, as tangible goods. 
The wizarding world also has restrictions on the use and possession of dangerous property.  The 
Ministry is able to confiscate Dark objects from the home of the wealthy and influential Lucius 
Malfoy,97 and Scrimgeour is able to invoke the Decree for Justifiable Confiscation to delay the 
transfer of Dumbledore's bequests for thirty-one days.98  This same law apparently allows all 
wills to be reviewed by the Ministry.99 
When one thinks of it, it is natural that a strong protection for private property would be the only 
wizarding law that matches Muggle law.  Private property is the chief means by which wealthy 
and powerful people maintain their differentiation from (and control over) their less fortunate 
compatriots.  Governments that wish to ameliorate these differentiations of rank often begin by 
taking away certain rights of private property, in extreme cases eliminating it altogether.  In the 
wizarding world, where wealth, family connections and magical ability count for nearly 
everything, it stands to reason that private property would be well protected. 
 
VIII. Tort Law Gone Missing 
Tort law is the means by which individuals enlist the aid of the courts in obtaining compensation 
for wrongs committed by others.  If my neighbor damages my land or injures me through his 
carelessness, or through some other wrongful act such as slander, invasion of privacy or trespass, 
then I can ask a court to order my neighbor to compensate me for the loss I suffered.  The ability 
to receive compensation in tort is an old common law right, and occupies much of the attention 
of contemporary civil courts. 
Tort law is distinguished from criminal law (which also deals with wrongful behavior) in the 
following way.  While tort law describes a relationship between the perpetrator of the wrong and 
the victim (you must compensate me because you hurt me), criminal law describes a relationship 
between the perpetrator and the state (you must be punished because you offended public order).  
In some cases the same physical action (battery, for example, or fraud) can give rise to both a 
civil tort lawsuit and a criminal prosecution, because two different interests (the interest of the 
victim and the interest of the community) have been offended. 
But while there is plentiful criminal law in the wizarding world, so far as I can determine it is 
utterly devoid of tort law.  Rita Skeeter and the Daily Prophet regularly publish false statements 
accusing people of mental instability, professional impropriety or even crime; such statements 
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are clearly libel under common law, but there is no indication that anyone has ever attempted to 
receive compensation for it.100  Wizards engage in risky and even reckless behavior with some 
frequency, occasionally causing harm to others in the process; again, there is no indication that 
anyone has tried to hold anyone liable in court for such behavior. 
What is remarkable is not that there is no tort law (one could easily imagine a society without it), 
but that tort law is absent in a context where so many other kinds of law (contracts, property, 
criminal law, consumer regulation) are so prevalent. 
But such a regime is consistent with the legal structures Rowling builds elsewhere.  The last 
thing the wizarding legal system would do would be to help an individual recover from wrongs 
done to him.  It is not a system designed to help individuals -- or rather, it is not designed to help 
any individuals who are not able to manipulate the strings of power and influence.  Tort law, 
which gives the wronged a way to hold those who wrong them accountable, has no place here.  
Criminal law does, because criminal law maintains the status quo and makes sure that the 
existing order is not altered.  But laws to help individuals are absent.  
 
IX. Equal Justice Under Law 
Equality under the law is one of the cornerstones of Anglo-American justice.  The requirement of 
an impartial judge or "jury of peers," the insistence on proportionality and predictable application 
of rules, all point to this principle.  One of the reasons people in our civilization are willing to 
tolerate some of the gross inequities of wealth, influence and personal power is that we have, at 
least in theory, radical equality before the law and the polity.  Anatole France's cynical 
comment101 notwithstanding, most people believe in, or yearn for, the "majestic equality of the 
law." 
There is nothing remotely resembling equality under law in Rowling's world.  The most gross 
and obvious demonstration of this fact is the way non-humans, part-humans, altered humans and 
Muggles are treated by law. 
Non-humans, even magical non-humans, are forbidden by law to carry a wand;102 the secret of 
wand-making is closely guided by wizards, and even the highly intelligent and powerful goblins 
are not permitted to have them, a matter of bitter dispute between the two races for centuries.103  
A measure of the esteem in which goblins are held by wizard institutions may be seen in the fact 
that the Goblin Liaison Office is part of the Department for the Regulation and Control of 
Magical Creatures, the same department that handles pest control.104 Attacks by non-human or 
part-humans on witches or wizards are legally distinct from attacks on humans by one another.105  
Giants are hunted down, killed or exiled to settlements abroad that are not natural to them and 
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will lead to their eventual extinction, to the point where they attack at the mere sight of a 
wand.106  House-elves, as noted above, are property.  From all appearances wizards use legal 
measures to ensure their privileged position among magical beings. 
Muggles are treated as so thoroughly different that a great deal of wizarding law and government 
is designed to maintain the separation between them.107  Hiding magic from Muggles is such a 
high priority that doing magic in front of them is a crime that can result in the permanent loss of 
one's legal right to perform magic,108 which, as noted above, is the equivalent of exile.  Mentally 
infirm wizards and witches are locked up to avoid giving the presence of magic away to 
Muggles.109  All this is putatively in the interests of Muggles as well as wizards ("Blimey, Harry, 
everyone'd be wantin' magic solutions to their problems"),110 but Schwabach has pointed out: 
[I]f magic could cure Muggle ills, it seems selfish of the wizarding world to deny the Muggles the 
benefit of their assistance. Madame Pomfrey, the Hogwarts school healer, can regrow missing 
bones overnight, and could probably save the lives of millions of Muggles. To provide a moral 
justification for keeping Madame Pomfrey at Hogwarts healing minor Quidditch injuries, rather 
than in Africa saving Muggle children from malaria and AIDS, something more compelling is 
needed. A mere desire to be left alone is not enough.111 
Among wizards themselves, the division between Muggle-borns and supposedly "pure blood" 
wizards is social and political, not legal, at least until Voldemort takes over the Ministry.  Prior 
to that time the bigoted supremacism of the Malfoys and their ilk causes unpleasantness, ridicule 
and cruelty for Muggle-born wizards, but the law does not reflect that bigotry. 
Once Voldemort does take over the Ministry, a breathtaking variety of laws and procedures are 
enacted overnight to segregate, take wands from, torture and imprison Muggle-born witches and 
Wizards, under the auspices of the newly-created Muggle-born Registration Commission.112  
Again, as noted above, what is striking about this development is not that Voldemort or his 
Death Eaters would create such laws, but that they were so easy to create and that they were 
followed with such alacrity.  It is true that some Muggle-borns and their families resist by 
fleeing, some spontaneously as in the case of Ted Tonks and Dean Thomas,113 some at the urging 
of Harry and his friends.114  But it seems that the majority cooperate, and much of the pure-blood 
community seems happy to help. 
Selective enforcement of the law appears to be the rule rather than the exception.  Ministry 
employees are able to insert loopholes into statutes in order to allow their own private pursuits.115  
Fudge exempts Harry from the restriction on underage magic when it suits him,116 then, two 
                                                 
106 Id., at 426-31. 
107 SS, supra note 1, at 64-65. 
108 OotP, supra note 21, at 26-27. 
109 DH, supra note 18, at 564. 
110 SS, supra note 1, at 65. 
111 Schwabach, supra note 6, at 332. 
112 DH, supra note 18, at 209, 246-67. 
113 Id., at 295. 
114 Id., at 264. 
115 CoS, supra note 15, at 39. 
116 PoA, supra note 7, at 45. 
Schneyer, No Place to Stand, 1.0  Page 18 of 22 
years later, vigorously prosecutes him for violating exactly the same law;117 in both cases his 
reasons are political.  When he feels threatened by Dumbledore, Fudge puts a number of 
provisions in place specifically aimed at curtailing Dumbledore's power and influence.118  Ludo 
Bagman escapes sanction for suspected Death Eater activity less because of his actual innocence 
and more because of his fame as a Quidditch star.119  Pius Thicknesse puts transport restrictions 
on the Privet Drive residence that do not apply anywhere else.120 Rufus Scrimgeour selectively 
employs a statute designed to stop the conveyance of Dark object in order to try to unlock the 
secrets of Dumbledore's plan to fight Voldemort.121  In the area of school rules (which are not 
laws, but which mirror them symbolically and functionally) Snape is notoriously unfair in his 
enforcement of rules, even inventing them on the spot when it suits him,122 and even 
McGonagall, repeatedly described in the text as "very fair," exempts Harry from the ban on first-
year students owning broomsticks so that he can win the Quidditch Cup for Gryffindor.123 
Unfortunately this easy willingness to cooperate with divisiveness, inequality and evil familiar to 
us.  Throughout our history we have seen despots alter laws to suit their need to oppress their 
political enemies or others they despise, and we have seen populations easily cooperating with 
those changed rules.  If the despots are later overthrown, ordinary citizens who cooperated say 
they did so out of fear for their safety or the safety of their families.  Perhaps this is true.  But it 
is also true that there is nearly always a resistance, someone willing to risk harm in order to 
restore what they perceive to be justice.  So it is in the Harry Potter novels. 
 
X. The Ministry of Magic 
Law is inextricably linked with the institutions of government.  Legislatures create laws and are, 
in some cases, created by them.  The executive carries out and enforces these laws, while the 
judiciary interprets their meaning -- although in the common law system, the judiciary does a 
certain amount of "law making" of its own.  In modern democracies the legislative and highest 
executive officers stand for popular election; in the U.S. they are elected separately, while in the 
U.K. the elected party leaders of the legislative branch are also the heads of the executive branch.  
The judiciary is sometimes elected, sometimes appointed for lengthy terms. 
In most democracies of any scale, there is also a bureaucracy of permanent government 
employees who oversee the day-to-day business of the government.  They tend to focus on 
details, rules and consistency, and especially at the lower levels, may fail to see the larger policy 
issues at all.  But they work for elected officials who do at least attempt to further larger policy 
goals; the interaction between these two -- the policy end and the detail end -- is what makes 
government function. 
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Benjamin H. Barton has suggested that in Rowling's world, there is no government other than 
bureaucracy.124  Certainly there are no elections, but everyone seems to be a detail-oriented, 
rather than a policy-oriented, employee.  Consider the different branches of the Ministry of 
Magic:  
• Department of Magical Games and Sports: 
o British and Irish Quidditch League Headquarters 
o Official Gobstones Club 
o Ludicrous Patents Office 
• Department of Magical Transport: 
o Floo Network Authority 
o Broom Regulatory Control 
o Portkey Office 
o Apparition Test Center 
• Department of International Magical Cooperation: 
o International Magical Trading Standards Body 
o International Magical Office of Law 
o International Confederation of Wizards, British Seats 
• Department for the Regulation and Control of Magical Creatures: 
o Beast, Being and Spirit Divisions 
o Goblin Liaison Office 
o Pest Advisory Bureau 
• Department of Magical Accidents and Catastrophes: 
o Accidental Magic Reversal Squad 
o Obliviator Headquarters 
o Muggle-Worthy Excuse Committee 
• Department of Magical Law Enforcement: 
o Improper Use of Magic Office 
o Auror Headquarters 
o Wizengamot Administration Services125 
• Minister of Magic and Support Staff126 
 
Some of these departments, such as Magical Transport and Magical Law Enforcement, seem 
familiar.  The Department of Magical Cooperation is something like the Foreign Office or the 
Department of State.  But apart from that, one is struck by the level of trivia on this list.  There is 
no department concerned with the welfare of children, public health, sanitation, land use, 
monetary policy (except for the Goblin Liaison Office), employment, agriculture, industry, 
domestic commerce.   (Come to think of it, there's no taxing authority -- how are these 
employees paid?)  There are Apparition tests,127 Animagi must register,128 and apparently one 
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needs a license to trade in magical artifacts.129   Yet there is an entire floor devoted to games and 
sports, and employees in the Department of Magical Cooperation devote effort to determining 
the best thickness for imported cauldron bottoms. 
The Ministry is organized, in other words, to focus on details and not on the big picture. 
The Minister of Magic occupies an absurd and self-contradictory position in the Wizarding legal 
universe. He is clearly a chief executive, overseeing such offices as Magical Law Enforcement, 
and International Magical Cooperation and having direct authority over the main penal 
institution, Azkaban.  At the same time he has legislative authority, enacting "decrees," 
"regulations", "codes" and other statutory laws (indeed, even his junior officers such as Arthur 
Weasley130 and Dolores Umbridge131 apparently have significant law-drafting roles). He appears 
also to have judicial authority, as he serves as a presiding member of the Wizengamot, 
Wizarding Britain's high court.132  Consequently there is no separation of powers, no "checks and 
balances" on the Minister's authority. 
Yet we are left completely in the dark as to how Ministers are selected or removed from office.  
There is no election process we can see, no committee for selection of the Minister, no political 
parties to elect a party leader, no "kingmakers," no Praetorian Guard to install a Minister by 
force.  The selection of the Minister, indeed, is always expressed in the passive voice.  We know 
when it is done, but never who does it or how they do it.133 
We hear that Dumbledore was repeatedly "offered" the post of Minister (by whom?) but turned it 
down in favor of his duties at Hogwarts.134  Sirius reports that the ambitious and fanatical Barty 
Crouch, Sr. actively sought the position of Minister of Magic and "it looked like only a matter of 
time until Crouch got the top job",135 but was blamed publicly for the failures of his son, so that 
Cornelius Fudge "got the top job."136  Fudge, a weak-willed, bigoted, manipulative incompetent, 
retains the position in the face of numerous failures for fifteen years, "pelt[ing] Dumbledore with 
owls every morning, askin' fer advice,"137 until he is finally "sacked", the Wizarding community 
having "scream[ed] for [his] resignation" following the disclosure of Voldemort's return.138  Who 
sacks him, how he is sacked, and how Rufus Scrimgeour is put in his place, is never 
explained.139  After Scrimgeour's assassination, Pius Thicknesse, under the control of Voldemort, 
occupies the office, although, again, the mechanism for this is not explained.140  Finally, after the 
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fall of Voldemort, Kingsley Shacklebolt is "named" temporary Minister of Magic before the 
night is out.141 He seems to have been fighting at Hogwarts the whole time; who "named" him? 
How can someone with so much authority, authority that apparently is impossible to gainsay in 
any executive or legislative matter and difficult to gainsay even in the judiciary, how can such a 
person have no control over retaining his own job?  How is it that the mechanism for appointing 
someone so powerful is not understood?  Clearly the method of selection does not matter to 
Rowling; once the Minister is in place, he begins to act in his own political interests. 
The Ministry of Magic is an ineffectual government even though it has no checks on its power.  
It is obsessed with trivia even though there are urgent matters at hand.  Its leader has near-
unilateral authority but no control over his own job.  There is power, but no effectiveness.  Is this 
what Rowling believes government, at root to be?  Or is she giving us a different message, that 
for the lessons she is trying to convey an effective government is irrelevant? 
 
XI. But What Does It All Mean? 
The point, it seems to me, is the arbitrariness of human rule-making.  If rules and procedures are 
made by humans, they are subject to the same irrationalities and prejudices to which humans 
themselves are prone, and they solve nothing.  We cannot place our faith in rules, institutions or 
procedures, because all of these things are made and applied by human beings with human 
failings.  Any rule or institution, no matter how well conceived, is subject to our own weaknesses 
and love of power and domination.  No civilized regime can survive the apathy of its citizens. 
Part of Rowling's message is exactly this.  Our institutions of law, government and justice 
survive only so long as we say they do.  We exist in society of laws, rather than of powerful men, 
only because we choose to do so from day to day.  The instant that we lose our determination to 
do this, all façade of due process, equality, fairness and justice vanish. Laws are mere words, like 
the words of a spell.  Unless there is someone who puts his or her magic behind the spell, it has 
no effect. 
But in a greater sense, in Rowling's world the formal rules of law and government are almost 
irrelevant.   She would have us consider the purity and wholeness of the human soul.  Again and 
again she tells us that killing is destructive to the killer -- more ultimately destructive, indeed, 
than to the victim.  Voldemort's repeated murders to ensure his own immortality render him 
fragmented and spiritually maimed.  Harry intervenes to save Pettigrew from the other 
Marauders, not for Pettigrew's sake, but to protect Lupin and Sirius from the spiritual violence 
they would experience through committing such an act.  The acts that ultimately matter 
throughout the series are acts of self-sacrifice.  Harry repeatedly disregards rules and laws in the 
interests of what he believes to be right -- indeed, his teachers comment on this.  But Harry, not 
Hermione, is the hero of the story. 
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Human choices are good or bad in and of themselves.  A backdrop of regulation, statute or court 
decision does not render them more or less virtuous.  Formal norms cannot tell us the choices to 
make; only we can do that. 
 
 
